UIC Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 4

Article 8

2012

A Brave New World: Credit Default Swaps and Voluntary Debt
Exchanges, 45 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1227 (2012)
Mark Swantek

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the Securities Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark Swantek, A Brave New World: Credit Default Swaps and Voluntary Debt Exchanges, 45 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 1227 (2012)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss4/8
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

Do Not Delete

10/27/2012 3:34 PM

A BRAVE NEW WORLD: CREDIT DEFAULT
SWAPS AND “VOLUNTARY” DEBT
EXCHANGES
MARK A. SWANTEK*
“[T]he over-the-counter derivatives market is the San
Andreas Fault of our financial system. The interconnection of the
so-called ‘too-big-to-fail’ firms and the OTC derivatives are a
cocktail that may force the taxpayer to drink from disaster again
in the future.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

A financial crisis struck America in 2008,2 which became the
first truly global economic disaster.3 The downward spiral started
with the bursting of a housing bubble in the United States, but
has directly affected every economy.4 Some of America’s largest

* Mark A. Swantek is a January 2013 graduate of The John Marshall Law
School. He would like to give special thanks to Professor Karen HalversonCross for her help in selecting a topic as well as all of her guidance throughout
law school. Mark would also like to thank his mother, Kathleen Swantek, for
her
endless
and
selfless
support.
He
can
be
reached
at
mark.swantek@gmail.com.
1. Credit Default Swaps on Gov’t Debt: Potential Implications of the Greek
Debt Crisis Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t
Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. 111 Cong. 10 (2010)
(statement of Robert Johnson, Dir. of Global Fin., Roosevelt Inst.).
2. See generally The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy
Actions,
FED.
RES.
BANK
OF
ST.
LOUIS
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/pdf/CrisisTimeline.pdf
[hereinafter
Fed.
Timeline] (providing an overview of the subprime mortgage financial crisis).
3. Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some
Observations on the “Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of
2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 158 (2009).
4. Id. Professor Omarova explains that:
The industrialized countries, including the United States, the European
Union, and Japan, have suffered the bulk of the direct losses from the
rapid decline in the value of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed
securities, excessive leveraging of financial investments, and failure or
near-failure of the world’s largest financial institutions. China, Russia,
Brazil, and other emerging market economies suffered the secondary
effects of the stock market decline and credit shock in the industrialized
world, as the demand for their exports contracted severely and foreign
investors withdrew massive amounts of capital.
Id. For further discussion on the global effects of the 2008 financial crisis, see
1227
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and most iconic businesses came to the brink of collapse or indeed
failed.5 Credit default swaps (“CDS” or “CDSs”) played some role
in the collapse of AIG and Lehman Brothers, and critics heavily
scrutinized their use of these financial instruments, bringing them
to the national spotlight.6
The effects of the crisis have caused the world economy to
stall.7 Specifically, Greece is riddled with debt that has sent—and
continues to send—waves of uncertainty through global markets.8
European sovereign debt creates a new forum to discuss and
analyze CDS use and the interpretation of their terms.
The first part of this Comment introduces the basics of the
international financial regulatory regimes that gave birth to credit
derivatives. It then outlines the mechanics of CDS use and surveys
the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The second part looks at the legal
application of CDS contracts, specifically a recent shift to a strict
and narrow interpretation of the terms. Then, this Comment
proposes that this shift is overly restrictive and detracts from a
fundamental use of CDSs. The “brave new world” of a debt
stricken Europe and a fear of derivatives should not abrogate the
utility of CDSs.9

generally DICK K. NANTO ET AL., THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE GLOBAL
DIMENSION WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, (Congressional Research
Service ed., Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/115947.pdf.
5. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
(Mar. 14, 2008) http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/
20080314a.htm; see also Fed. Timeline, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. purchased Bear Sterns Cos. with financing provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). Bank of America Corp. bought
Merrill Lynch & Co. (without government assistance). Id. at 7. Lehman
Brothers Holdings, Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Id. The US
government purchased a significant equity stake in American International
Group Inc. (“AIG”) to prevent its collapse. Id. at 8, 10, 12, 20.
6. Rene M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 1, 73-92 (2010).
7. See Timeline: Euro Zone Debt Crisis, REUTERS (Jun 10, 2010, 10:24
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/10/us-eurozone-events-idUSTRE6
593G320100610 (charting various noteworthy events of the extended economic
crisis).
8. Id.; see also discussion infra Part 0 (summarizing some of Greece’s
sovereign debt issues and the attempts at curing the crisis).
9. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). This is a dystopian novel
that portrays a one-state futuristic world that is highly mechanized. The title
is ironic as the civilization in the book is shocking and undesirable. The novel
is seen as a foreboding critique of the industrial revolution and overmechanization of society. The characters living in this twisted world think it is
a utopia; however, the reader, as an outsider, sees the true pitfalls.
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II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces CDSs from a historical and
mechanical perspective, then gives an overview of the devolution
of the Greek economy and the role of CDSs in bailout negotiations.
A. Basel and the Birth of Credit Derivatives
In their simplest form, banks are in the business of lending
and borrowing money, incurring losses when a borrower defaults.10
To ensure that a wave of unexpected losses does not put a bank
into bankruptcy, a bank must ensure it has reserves to cover
unexpected losses.11 Reserve capital, as it is known, promotes bank
stability, but also decreases funds available for investment,
thereby lowering banks’ ability to profit.12
In 1976, the Bank for International Settlements organized a
standing committee of the central bank governors of the G-10
countries.13 This committee sought to facilitate cooperation
between major economies in forming fundamental banking
standards.14 In late 1987, the committee agreed upon a “capital
measurement” system known as the Basel Capital Accord (“Basel
Accords”).15 This system created a method for assessing the
adequacy of capital with specific regard to credit risk.16 In short,
the Basel Accords mandated that banks maintain a capital reserve

10. Sandra Rutova & Tim Volkheimer, Revisiting the Basel Accords:
Lessons Learned from the Credit Crisis, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 83, 84
(2011).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 84-85.
13. See History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
history.pdf [hereinafter History of Basel] (outlining the history of the Basel
regulatory regime). Members of the Group of Ten (G-10) include Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Members and Partners,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersand partners (last visited Aug. 29,
2012).
14. History of Basel, supra note 13, at 1.
15. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards, BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (July 1988),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf [hereinafter Basel I] (both
“Basel” and “Basle” are appropriate spellings); see also HAL S. SCOTT,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 414
(17th ed. 2010) (explaining the Basel agreements and the implications on
financial institutions).
16. See Rutova & Volkheimer, supra note 10, at 85-86 (noting that the aim
of the regulation was to “strengthen the stability of the international banking
system and to remove competitive advantages among banks”).
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equaling at least eight percent of its risk-weighted assets.17
Capital is a term of art has no uniform definition. The United
States requires at least half of a bank’s mandatory capital be
equity.18 This mandate caused banks and bank holding companies
to create hybrid instruments that are sufficiently similar to equity
to qualify as Tier I capital.19 Tier II capital is more residual.20
A fundamental aspect of the Basel Accords, inter alia, was the
imposition of risk-weighting.21 The purpose is that assets with
lower credit-risk will require less capital to be held in reserve.22
Banks, then, will multiply the face dollar amount of an asset by
the appropriate risk-weight percentage to determine how much
reserve capital is required.23 The US rules set out four categories
of assets and assign a percentage to each.24 Category 1, the zero

17. Basel I, supra note 15, at 14. This requirement came into effect in 1992.
Id.
18. See Federal Reserve System, Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State
Member Banks, Risk-Based Measure, 12 C.F.R. § 208, App. A, II.-III. (2007)
(stating that in the US, “qualifying capital” is divided into two “tiers” and
charting out the different risk weights assigned to various assets). The first
tier consists of common shareholders’ equity (cash), which must make up at
least half of the firm’s capital (four percent of weighted-risk assets); and other
low-risk, high-liquidity assets. Id. at II.A.1. Tier II consists of supplementary
capital, which is less liquid and more speculative. Id. at II.A.2.
19. See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 418-19 (identifying that banks search for
hybrid instruments and noting that there can be hotly contested debates as to
which tier to classify certain instruments).
20. Id. Tier II capital includes including loan loss reserves and a capped
amount of unrealized appreciation of certain equities and real estate. Id. at
418. For the official American capital guidelines, see 12 C.F.R. § 225, App. A
(2007). Also, loan loss reserves are held to cover future unknown losses and
not present loses. Allowances for Loan and Lease Losses: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Banking and
Fin. Serv. 106 Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of Donna Tanoue, Chairman, FDIC),
available
at
http://archives.financialservices.house.gov/banking/61699
tan.shtml. It is added to a bank’s portfolio when it becomes probable that a
loan or group of loans will not be fully collected and the amount can be
estimated. Id. Then, the institution is required to establish a reserve account
and recognize a loss against current earnings. Id. This represents credit losses
inherent in an institution’s loan portfolio given the facts and circumstances as
of the evaluation date.
21. See Rutova & Volkheimer, supra note 10, at 85-86 (noting that one of
three “pillars” of the Accord was risk-weighting). The other two pillars are
constituents of capital and a target standard ratio. Id.
22. Id. For example, the goal of the US codification of the Basel accords is
to make regulatory capital requirements more sensitive to differences in risk
profiles among banks. 12 C.F.R. § 208, app. A (2011).
23. See Rutova & Volkheimer, supra note 10, at 86-87; see also ANTULIO N.
BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS
32 (2005) (giving the formula: regulatory capital charge = r x .08 x notional
exposure).
24. See generally SCOTT, supra note 15, at 421-23 (outlining that the four
percentages are zero, twenty, fifty, and one hundred percent).
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percent class—meaning no capital requirement—consists of the
safest devices such as cash, US Treasury bonds, and gold bullion.25
On the other hand, the one-hundred percent class will require
eight percent capital to offset credit risk.26 Category 3 assets carry
a fifty percent weight.27 These assets include fully secured
residential loans and revenue bonds from OECD governments.28
The Basel Accord became final in 1992,29 and the effects
varied.30 As the imposition of a reserve capital requirement
effectively made certain types of behavior more expensive, the
eight percent capital reserve requirement is a restriction.31 An
obvious method to circumvent this and to free up more capital for
investment (and profit) was to use certain risk-weighted assets to
avoid the eight percent requirement.32 As mentioned above, banks
could cut the capital requirement in half by putting residential
mortgages and sovereign debt instruments on their books.33
This paradigm gave birth to the use of credit derivatives.34

25. 12 C.F.R. § 208, App. A; SCOTT, supra note 15, at 421.
26. SCOTT, supra note 15, at 422. These are the “riskiest” loans. Examples
of these assets are private loans, long-term claims on non-OECD foreign
banks, claims on non-OECD governments, and real estate and physical capital
(plants and equipment, to name a few). Id. at 423.
27. Id. at 422.
28. Id. Its members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. It is also worth noting
that fully secured commercial loans carry a one hundred percent risk-weight,
whereas residential loans carry a fifty percent risk-weight. Id.
29. Id. at 426.
30. See id. at 424 (noting the lots of money went into US government debt
rather than private loans, effectively amounting to a credit crunch); Paul
Atkinson, The Basel Capital Adequacy Framework Should Be Reconsidered,
GROUPE D’ECONOMIE MONDIALE POLICY BRIEF 14 (October 2008), available at
http://gem.sciencespo.fr/content/publications/pdf/Atkinson_BaselII17112008.pdf (stating “it is
obvious that two decades of practice have not matched the promise” of a sound
and stable banking system).
31. See BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 33 (noting that “[h]olding too much
capital in reserve is expensive—the bank would have to forego the income that
the held capital could generate, for instance, if it were lent to prospective
borrowers”).
32. See id. (stating “banks have taken measures to reduce their regulatory
capital requirements while staying within the limits prescribed by bank
regulators”).
33. See 12 C.F.R. § 208, App. A (specifying the risk-weights); see also
BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 31-33 (outlining the various economic effects of the
Basel Accord).
34. See Michael Phillips, The Monster that Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 26, 2008 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/09/26/
the-monster-that-ate-wall-street.html (tracing the origins of CDSs).
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A credit derivative is a financial contract whose value is derived
from the value of debt obligations issued by one or more reference
entities.35 The “regulatory changes . . . spurred the development of
tools for a more active management of risk and capital.”36 Credit
derivatives allowed a bank to isolate credit risk, protect against it,
and reduce its “regulatory capital charge.”37 These instruments
exploded onto the financial scene, with gross notional amounts (or
total debt insured) growing from below $2 trillion in 2002 to nearly
$60 trillion in 2007.38 Credit derivatives function to “help bring
[banks’] regulatory capital requirements closer in line with their
economic capital.”39 This method of “regulatory capital
management,” born by the Basel Accords, “played a significant role
in the evolution of the credit derivatives market.”40
B. Credit Default Swaps
A CDS is the predominant type of credit derivative.41 The
metaphor most often used to describe a CDS is an insurance
policy.42 One important difference, though, is that neither party to
a CDS contract needs to own the referenced underlying entity,
have an insurable interest, or suffer any loss.43 These are called
“naked” swaps.44 CDSs, in financial jargon, are “financial

35. Over-the-Counter Derivatives Before the Subcomm. on Securities,
Insurance, and Investment, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (testimony of Patrick M.
Parkinson, Dep. Dir., Div. Research and Statistics) (July 9, 2008) , available at
http://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/testimony/parkinson20080709a.htm. [hereinafter Testimony
of Patrick M. Parkinson].
36. Christian Weistroffer, Credit Default Swaps: Heading Towards a More
Stable System, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH: CURRENT ISSUES, 5 (Dec. 21,
2009), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_ENPROD/PROD0000000000252032.PDF.
37. See BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 34 (explaining that after buying
protection for credit risk, the only remaining risk was that of the counterpart
risk of the protection seller).
38. Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 1.
39. BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 5. The idea of “economic capital” is what a
“prudent bank would want to hold in reserve given its overall credit risk
exposure.” Id. at 33.
40. Id. at 34.
41. Testimony of Patrick M. Parkinson, supra note 35.
42. See LAURENT L. JACQUE, GLOBAL DERIVATIVE DEBACLES: FROM
THEORY TO MALPRACTICE 279 (2010) (stating that “even though there may be
some debate as to whether CDS are more akin to financial [instruments] than
insurance products, it remains the CDS are closely related to traditional
insurance products”).
43. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 4 (observing that underlying entities,
for CDS purposes, are almost always corporate or sovereign borrowers).
44. See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 852 (addressing the various strategies a
party may institute by assuming credit risk on assets without acquiring them).

Do Not Delete

2012]

10/27/2012 3:34 PM

A Brave New World

1233

instruments to hedge and trade credit risk.”45 Legally, a CDS is a
contract that guarantees payment if a “credit event” occurs in
exchange for a premium payment.46 The definition of a credit
event, then, is critical to the contract.47
1. The Mechanics of Credit Default Swaps
There are two sides to a CDS contract: the protection buyer
and protection seller.48 The protection buyer, who does not need to
own the reference entity, makes regular payments to the
protection seller.49 This is the CDS premium.50 In turn, the
protection seller guarantees to “settle the contract,” or pay the
protection buyer its incurred loss.51 Enumerated “credit events”

45. Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 3.
46. See id. at 4 (offering that payments are typically annual).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. 2008 market-share estimations show that 33% of protection sellers
are banks in trading activities, 31% were hedge funds, 18% were monoline and
other insurers, and 7% were banks in loan portfolio activities. Id. For
protection buyers, 36% were banks in trading activities, 28% were hedge
funds, 18% were banks in loan portfolio activities, and 6% were monoline and
other insurers. Id. This data shows that the main CDS market participants
are traders and hedge funds, with only a small portion going towards loan
portfolios. Id. at 6, Figure 2, 3.
50. Id. at 4. The research states:
The CDS premium is calculated to cover the expected loss of the
reference entity. There are two main parameters that determine the
expected loss and hence the CDS premium: (i) The probability of default
(PD), and (ii) the recovery rate (RR):
CDS Premium = PD * (1-RR)
Assuming a recover rate of zero, a 1% default probability translates into
a 100 basis points annual premium. Although the premium is calculated
on an annual basis, it is usually paid in quarterly terms. Thus, a
protection buyer of a CDS contract with notional value of USD 10m (and
an agreed premium of 100 basis points) has to pay a quarterly amount
of USD 25,000 to insure against default of the reference entity.
Id.
51. Id. at 4. This is generally the difference between the face value of the
underlying security and the amount that can be recovered from the underlying
reference borrower (e.g., government that issued bond). Id. Settlement of a
CDS contract occurs at the end of its life span when a credit event has
triggered compensation payment. Id. Protection buyer and seller usually agree
on a method of settlement up-front. Id. Physical settlement involves the
protection buyer delivering the underlying bond in exchange for compensation.
Id. Cash settlement obligates the protection seller to pay the buyer the
difference between the bond value at the time of settlement and the bond’s
nominal value in cash. Id. An interesting hypothetical is if a naked protection
buyer, i.e., one that does not own the underlying entity, sustains a credit event
and the contract calls for physical delivery. Id. Theoretically, the protection
buyer must then go purchase the underlying entity in the open market. This
could potentially cause a run on certain bonds even though the borrower is
somehow in default. Id.
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relating to the underlying reference entity condition this
obligation.52
CDS contracts are “over-the-counter” (“OTC”) derivatives,
meaning they are not bought and sold on regulated exchanges;53
rather, they are private contracts between private parties.54
Therefore, the parties must negotiate and agree upon their own
terms.55
The general provisions of these contracts have been
standardized by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (“ISDA”), a global financial trade association.56
52. See JOÃO GARCIA & SERGE GOOSSENS, THE ART OF CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: DEMYSTIFYING THE BLACK SWAN 22 (2010) (observing that an
“important legal issue on a CDS contract is the precise definition of what is
considered a credit event”) (emphasis in original).
53. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit
Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 172 (2011) (explaining that
CDS and OTC transactions lack the formality of exchanges and that
regulations might not require participants to register or record their
transaction). Sometimes, this lack of formality is criticized as muddying the
transactions as one cannot understand the counterparty risk at bar. Id.
“Regulation of the OTC derivates markets is often piecemeal and performed by
the individual regulators of the parties, e.g. bank or securities firm
regulators.” PAUL C. HARDING, MASTERING THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATION 3 (2002).
54. See Johnson, supra note 53, at 172 (noting that some commentators
have described the OTC market as part of a “shadow banking system”); see
generally Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit
Default Swaps Bring Down AIG and Lehman Brothers, 5 BUS. L. BRIEF (AM.
U.) 15, 16-18 (2008) (asserting that “the unregulated and opaque CDS market
helped to fuel a ‘death spiral’ for these firms that, ironically, got into financial
difficulty to begin with by improvidently entering into a large number of CDS
contracts as an insufficiently capitalized insurer”). This has been the focus of
much scrutiny in the wake of the 2008 subprime mortgage crash and the
ensuing financial crisis. Id. Critics point to this lack of transparency as the
cause of the systemic effects of the subprime crisis. Id. Lehman Bros. and AIG
were protection sellers on many mortgage-backed securities. Id. When the real
estate bubble burst, many of those obligations became due and those firms
suffered staggering losses. Lehman Bros. also invested heavily in real estate,
so this created a deadly couplet. Id. AIG sold protection to just about everyone.
Id. As the bubble burst, many counter-parties to AIG’s various insurance
products worried about AIG’s ability to pay its obligations, so they demanded
AIG post more collateral. Id. Both of these firms over-leveraged their own
bets, but this was masked by the private nature of OTC derivatives. Id.
Following this theme, speculators were able to buy up CDS against Bear
Stearns, Lehman, and AIG, betting that they would default on their
obligations. Id. This created a downward pressure in the market. Id. Investors
also began shorting their stocks, and then, to be colloquial, the rest is history.
Id.
55. See HARDING, supra note 53, at 15 (introducing the basics of the ISDA
documentation process). This is a complex process involving complicated
negotiations regarding credit, legal, and tax issues. Id.
56. About ISDA, ISDA http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ (last visited Aug.
30, 2012).
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Founded in 1985, ISDA focuses on making OTC derivatives
markets safe and efficient.57 It is comprised of over eight hundred
members and works to enhance international derivatives use.58
ISDA has a “Master Agreement” that serves as a standard form
contract for CDSs.59 The goal was to avoid disputes as to whether
a credit event had actually occurred or how a contract should be
settled.60 ISDA works towards “the development and maintenance
of a wide range of standard derivatives documentation, which
facilitates the efficient documentation of transactions and
promotes sound business practices.”61
Specifically with regard to credit derivatives, ISDA primarily
works in documentation, public policy, market structure, market
practices, and research.62 It has certain “Credit Derivatives
Determinations
Committees”
(hereinafter
known
as
“Determinations Committees” or “Committees”) in a variety of
global marketplaces.63 These Committees deliberate on issues
involving the reference entity under the CDS contract and issues
binding decisions.64 ISDA only acts as a non-voting secretary to
each Committee.65 These Committees can resolve a credit event
dispute where one party believes a credit event has occurred and
the other does not.66

57. Id.
58. Id. ISDA’s goals are to reduce counterparty credit risk, increase
transparency, and improve the industry’s operational infrastructure. Id.
59. See generally HARDING, supra note 53, at 19 (noting that ISDA began
to standardize market practice and documentation).
60. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 20.
61. Recent Documents, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legaland-documentation/recent-documents/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
62. Credit Derivatives/Credit Default Swaps, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/
asset-classes/credit-derivatives/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
63. About the Credit Determinations Committee, ISDA, http://www.isda.
org/credit/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). The Determinations Committees
operate according to a rather thorough set of rules. Credit Derivatives
Determinations
Committee
Rules,
ISDA,
http://www.isda.org/credit/
revisedcrules.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). A Determinations Committee
exists in the Americas, Asia (excluding Japan), Australia-New Zealand,
Europe, and Japan. About the Credit Determinations Committee, ISDA
http://dc.isda.org/about-dc-committees/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
64. About
the
Credit
Determinations
Committee,
ISDA
http://dc.isda.org/about-dc-committees/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
65. Id.
66. Credit Derivatives Determinations Committee Rules (July 11, 2011
Version) Rule 3.1(b), available at http://www.isda.org/credit/docs/DC_Rules
_(July-11_2011).pdf.
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2. The Gains from Trade of Credit Default Swaps
CDSs have valuable roles in financial markets.67 Broadly,
they are risk management tools, trading instruments, and
economic indicators.
a. Use in Business: Risk Management and Hedging
A hedge is the “use of two compensating or offsetting
transactions to ensure a position of break even.”68 CDSs are a
complement to traditional hedging methods.69 Rather than adjust
the underlying loan portfolio, a protection buyer can manage its
risk exposure with an arm’s length transaction.70 Mechanically, a
CDS allows a party to offset its exposure to the risk of loss that
comes with lending agreements or debt securities.71 Reducing risk
has two major benefits: first, it lessens the susceptibility to
economic loss;72 second, the protection buyer may have more free
capital to invest.73 A CDS isolates the credit risk from an
underlying bond and transfers it to another entity.74 Moreover,
banks that hold assets not easily bought and/or sold can protect
against credit loss even though it cannot transfer the assets

67. See generally BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 70-72 (explaining the various
functional utilities of CDSs).
68. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (9th ed. 2009). The definition further
states that the purpose of a hedge is “to make advance arrangements to
safeguard oneself from loss on an investment, speculation, or bet, as when a
buyer of commodities insures against unfavorable price changes by buying in
advance at a fixed rate for later delivery.” Id.
69. Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 8; see also Johnson, supra note 53, at 199
(adding that this is the most frequently cited benefit of CDSs).
70. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 8 (explaining that this is also helpful
because it will avoid potentially offending a customer by questioning its
creditworthiness).
71. See Johnson, supra note 53, at 199-200 (relating the use of CDSs in
debt markets to traditional hedging methods from equity markets and
suggesting that a CDS is “an instrument that completes credit markets
because the instruments allow market participants to offset exposure to risk of
loss”).
72. See id. (describing that CDS agreements offset the monetary risk a
lender faces). For example, if a pension fund manager
agrees to lend fifty million dollars to an orange grove, she hopes that
there will be great harvests each year that loan remains outstanding. If
the pension fund manager enters into a [CDS] with a credible
counterparty to cover 10 percent of the investment risk exposure, the
pension fund manager offers five million dollars of her exposure to the
risk that the orange grove may fail to repay its obligations.
Id. at 200.
73. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 8 (stating that with CDS protection,
less capital will be committed to the loan).
74. MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP BASIS 3 (2006). This
makes it possible to separate the ownership and management of credit risk
from the other features of ownership associated with that bond. Id.
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themselves.75 A CDS is practically used to transfer credit risk
exposure to another party.76
b. Use as a Trading Instrument
Recall that a protection buyer does not need to be exposed to
the underlying risk.77 In this sense, CDSs turn credit into an
asset.78 They attempt to isolate only the credit quality of the
reference entity.79 One who buys protection can sell it for a profit if
there is a credit event or if it appears one is on the horizon.80
Trading CDSs, then, is thought to increase liquidity by improving
the chances of protection buyers or sellers finding a contract
partner and enhancing pricing efficiency.81
c.

Use as an Economic Indicator

The bond market is often looked at as a macroeconomic
indicator.82 However, this is influenced by many other factors
besides credit risk, notably interest rate risk and liquidity risk.83
As noted above, CDSs allow credit risk to be isolated.84 This
isolation from other risk factors makes CDS spreads (the premium
payment for default protection) a better indicator of market
distress.85 Furthermore, it may also digest market information
more quickly than prices in other markets.86 CDS spreads serve as
an important source of information for private banks, central
banks, supervisors, and international organizations because they
effectively put a price on credit as an asset.87

75. Id.
76. Id. at 9
77. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 8.
78. CHOUDHRY, supra note 74, at 3.
79. See BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 5 (stating “[c]redit derivates potentially
give market participants the ability to trade risks that were previously
virtually untradeable because of poor liquidity”).
80. Id. at 9-10.
81. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 9 (offering the two-sided argument
that trading improved the chances of buyers and sellers finding a contract
party, but excessive trading may distort the pricing mechanism).
82. See BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 39-40 (2005) (noting that the price of
credit derivates reflects market sentiments).
83. See Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 9 (adding that bond spreads and CDS
spreads are complementary as they synthesize similar information, albeit
differently). CDS spreads tend to be more of a leading market indicator. Id.
84. Id. This is extremely valuable because isolating credit risk eliminates
all other factors to give a more accurate analysis. Id.
85. Id.
86. See BOMFIM, supra note 23, at 40 (explaining that it is easier to enter
into swap agreements than buy or sell certain instruments and therefore the
swap markets reflect market information that may otherwise be hidden).
87. Weistroffer, supra note 36, at 9.
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C. Big Bang of “The Brave New World”
The European Union became riddled with sovereign debt
issues in the post-financial crisis world, many of these issues
stemming from a Grecian crisis.88 In the fall of 2009, the newly
elected Greek government discovered a budget deficit that was
twice what the exiting administration had disclosed.89 Reacting to
this disclosure and the government’s “crumbling finances,” the
three major credit rating agencies downgraded their Greek debt
ratings.90 The Greek government, facing international political
pressure and an uneasy bond market, passed wildly unpopular
austerity measures.91 Greece then had the full attention of the
bond markets and investors began to analyze every move, even
focusing their attention on other indebted European economies to
start what was a wild summer of 2010.92 Bond yields grew and the
price to insure Greek debt reached record highs.93 The interplay
between the bond market and the CDS market continued to drive
bond yields upward to nearly nine percent, leading the prime
minister to describe his economy as “a sinking ship” and formally
requested an international bailout.94 Eventually, Greece received
nearly $1 trillion in emergency funding.95 The turbulence did not
subside, however, as the bond markets continued to puppeteer
contentious political posturing and unleashed violent internal

88. Jan Ambrose & Joshua Buch, The Greek and Irish near Sovereign
Defaults: Similarities and Differences, 40 No. 2 REAL ESTATE REV. J. ART 2
(2011) (stating that Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are all riddled
with debt and are in bad economic shape).
89. Tayyab Mahmud, Is It Greek or Déja Vu All over Again?: Neoliberalism
and Winners and Losers of International Debt Crises, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 629,
639 (2011); Timeline: Euro Zone Debt Crisis, supra note 7.
90. Mahmud, supra note 89, at 639; David Jolly, Moody’s Joins Others in
Cutting Debt Rating on Greece, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/business/global/23drachma.html.
91. Mahmud, supra note 89, at 640-41; Greek Parliament Passes New
Austerity Budget, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business-16062878.
92. Mahmud, supra note 89, at 640; Landon Thomas Jr., Under Siege in
Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/
business/global/08euro.html?pagewanted=all.
93. See id. (calling speculators “bond vigilantes,” suggesting that these
investors perpetuated unreasonable expectations to reform domestic policies,
and commenting that demanding high interest rates on Greek bonds
exacerbated the problem).
94. Mahmud, supra note 89, at 648; Niki Kitsantonis & Matthew
Saltmarsh, Greece, Out of Ideas, Requests Global Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/business/global/24drachma.html
(adding that investors “shunned the country’s bond offerings because of
concern about its runaway debt”).
95. David Muir, Markets Rebound After Europe’s Leaders Bail Out Greece,
ABC WORLD NEWS (May 10, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/marketsrebound-european-leaders-bail-greece/story?id=10608764.
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opposition to the policies in Greece.96
Moody’s downgraded Greek debt to a “junk bond” in June
2010.97 In January 2011, three major ratings agencies demoted
Greek debt to “junk” status, and by June 2011, Moody’s had moved
Greece’s credit rating even deeper into “junk” territory.98 By June
13, 2011, Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greek debt to the lowest
credit rating in the world.99 During this time span, more austerity
measures went into place as the Greek populous continued to
organize vehement opposition.100
On July 21, 2011, European leaders agreed to a second Greek
bailout package.101 The terms of this package marked a significant
shift in sovereign debt policy.102 Traditionally, taxpayers paid for
the entire bailout while investors in debt were largely made
whole.103 This time around, the terms of the rescue package
included a contribution from private sector bondholders wherein
they exchanged their bonds for ones with later maturation
dates.104

96. Matthew Saltmarsh, Default Fears Return to European Debt, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9503E
EDC173BF935A1575BC0A9669D8B63.
97. Moody’s Cuts Greek Rating to Junk, REUTERS (June 14, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/14/us-greece-junkratings-moodys-idUS
TRE65D46W20100614. Interestingly enough, this downgrade did not affect
the CDS market for Greek debt. Id. A senior currency analyst at BNP Paribas
said “[w]e’ve been trading with this for a long time now and just the fact that
the agencies finally recognize reality doesn’t have too much impact.” Id.
98. TIMELINE-Greece’s Debt Crisis, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/28/greece-economy-events-idUSL5E7K
R2D120110928.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Luke Baker & Julien Toyer, Europe Agrees Sweeping New Action on
Debt Crisis, REUTERS (July 21, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/
21/us-eurozone-idUSTRE76I5X620110721.
102. Mahmud, supra note 89, at 650; Andrew E. Kramer, The Euro in 2010
Feels Like the Ruble in 1998, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/business/global/12iht-ruble.html?dbk
(explaining that the first Greek bailout package paralleled similar efforts to
bail out Russia in that the sovereign took on large loans in order to repay its
obligations to investors).
103. Id.
104. Stephen Castle & Niki Kitsantonis, Markets Lend Their Support to
Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/
business/global/Reactions-to-the-Greece-Bailout-Plan.html.
The
plan
suggested that:
Banks and insurers will voluntarily swap their Greek bonds for longer
maturities at lower interest rates to help Athens. Acknowledging that
the swap scheme may lead to Greece being declared in selective default,
Sarkozy said euro zone nations stood ready to protect Greek banks from
the fallout, by providing credit guarantees if needed to ensure they can
still obtain liquidity from the European Central Bank.
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After the bailout was announced, the German Chancellor,
Angela Merkel, stressed that any private sector involvement
would be voluntary and not legally obligatory.105 On this accord,
ISDA released an opinion that since the exchange of debt is
“expressly voluntary, it should not trigger CDS.”106 The tentative
terms of the deal force bankers to take a fifty percent reduction in
the face value of their Greek bond holdings.107 Chancellor Merkel
used CDSs as a sword, telling bankers to “[a]ccept the 50 percent
write-down . . . or bear the consequences of default.”108 To rescue
Greece, Chancellor Merkel threatened to trigger a “credit event”
and place the blame solely on the bankers.109 The terms of that
deal, as it stood, did not trigger CDSs.110
Nevertheless, ISDA announced on March 9, 2012, that a
restructuring credit event had occurred, triggering the swaps.111
The Determinations Committee unanimously found that even
though there had been a voluntary debt exchange, Greek
Baker & Toyer, supra note 101.
105. Annika Breidthardt & Eric Kelsey, Merkel Confident of Private Sector
in Greek Bailout, REUTERS (July 22, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/07/22/eurozone-merkel-banks-idUSB4E7IJ00Q20110722.
Chancellor Merkel stated:
I believe there is a high probability that the numbers presents by the
IIF on private sector involvement will be achieved . . . A voluntary
contribution is a voluntary contribution and cannot be made legally
obligatory. But there is trust in this contribution and similar past
programmes add to this trust. And also there is an incentive for banks
to get involved.
Id.
106. Latest News: Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A (Update), ISDA (July 25,
2011), http://www2.isda.org/news/greek-sovereign-debt-qampa-update. The
true voluntary nature is to be seen as ISDA notes that at the time of its
statement, the agreement was simply a proposal. Id. To actually determine
whether the action should trigger a CDS, a user must submit a proposal to the
Determinations Committee. Id.
107. See Steven Erlanger & Stephen Castle, Calling Bankers’ Bluff, Merkel
Won
Europe
a
Debt
Plan,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
27,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/world/europe/europe-in-accord-on-basicsof-plan-to-save-the-euro.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all
(reporting the details of the deal as well as Merkel’s political maneuvering).
108. Id.
109. See id. (explaining the extraordinary fear of a “disorderly, involuntary
default” and the prospect that a “credit event” would throw “world financial
markets into turmoil, much as the collapse of Lehman Brothers did in the fall
of 2008).
110. See
Greek
Sovereign
Debt
FAQ,
ISDA,
available
at
http://www2.isda.org/greek-sovereign-cds/ (last updated March 19, 2012)
(stating “the Eurozone proposal is voluntary and not binding on all
bondholders. As such, it does not appear to be likely that the deal will trigger
payments under existing CDS contracts”).
111. News Release, ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee: Restructuring
Credit Event Has Occurred with Respect to the Hellenic Republic, ISDA
(March 9, 2012), available at http://www2.isda.org/greek-sovereign-cds/.

Do Not Delete

2012]

10/27/2012 3:34 PM

A Brave New World

1241

lawmakers inserted certain provisions into its bonds that allowed
them to strong-arm private investors into restructuring.112 That
specific action, according to ISDA, made the initially voluntary
program not voluntary at all and therefore entitled protection
buyers to a payout.113
CDSs are financial instruments that entitle the holder to a
payout upon the occurrence of certain events. These bilateral
contracts look to certain credit events to determine when a party
owes its counterparty. However, recent developments in Greece
have exposed the uncertainty that arises when a sovereign nation
teeters on the verge of collapse, and an entire regional economy
scrambles to keep it afloat.
III. DIFFERING SCOPES OF CDS CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Generally, ISDA-documented CDSs consider a “credit event”
to be one or more of the following: (1) bankruptcy,114 (2) failure to

112. See Katy Burne, Greek CDS Triggered by Use of Collective-Action
Clauses-ISDA Committee, WALL ST. J. (March 9, 2012, 3:38 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120309-712280.html (noting the country
forced private creditors into its debt restructuring who didn’t want to accept
the terms of the deal); see also Agustino Fontevecchia, ISDA Says Greece in
Default, CDS Will Trigger, FORBES (March 9, 2012, 2:51 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/03/09/on-greece-defaults-andthe-future-of-derivatives/ (adding that the collective action clauses effectively
forced a seventy-four percent haircut on bondholders that held out of the
voluntary plan).
113. Id.; Burne, supra note 112; see also Abigail Moses, Greece Auction to
Settle $3.2 Billion of Credit-Default Swaps, BLOOMBERG (March 18, 2012, 7:01
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-19/greece-auction-to-settle-3-2billion-of-credit-default-swaps.html (proffering that triggering and settlement
of the CDSs might actually have a positive effect on the struggling European
bond market).
114. 1999 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS § 4.2 [hereinafter 1999
DEFINITIONS]; 2003 ISDA CREDIT DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS § 4.3 [hereinafter
2003 DEFINITIONS]. A commentator’s summary of this credit event:
Bankruptcy occurs when the Reference entity is: (a) dissolved; (b)
becomes insolvent or admits it in writing; (c) makes a general
assignment, arrangement or composition for the benefit of its creditors;
(d) institutes or has instituted against it a proceeding seeking a
judgment of insolvency, bankruptcy or another similar law affecting the
rights of creditors, and such proceeding (i) results in such a judgment; or
(ii) is not dismissed within 30 days; (e) has a resolution passed for its
winding-up, official management or liquidation; (f) seeks or becomes
subject to the appointment of a receiver or a similar officer; (g) has
substantially all of its assets taken possession of by a secured creditor;
(h) causes or is subject to any similar event; or (i) takes any action in
furtherance, or consents to, any of the foregoing acts.
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Credit Derivatives and the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Process, HARVARD L. SCHOOL INT’L FIN. SEMINAR, 50 n.141 (Apr.
27, 2004) available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/llm/
sp27.pdf.
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pay,115 (3) obligation acceleration,116 (4) obligation default,117 (5)
repudiation/moratorium,118 or (6) restructuring.119 Unfortunately,

115. 1999 DEFINITIONS § 4.4; 2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.4; see also Verdier,
supra note 114, at 50 n.142 (quoting the Definitions and summarizing that an
“Obligation Default occurs when one or more Obligations have become capable
of being declared due and payable . . . as a result of . . . the occurrence of a
default [or] event of default other . . . than a failure to make any required
payment”).
116. 1999 DEFINITIONS § 4.3; 2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.3; see also Verdier,
supra note 114, at 50 n.143 (noting the difference between Obligation
Acceleration and Obligation Default is that “in addition to the obligations
being capable of being declared due and payable, they have actually been so
declared”).
117. See 1999 DEFINITIONS § 4.5 (stating that “after the expiration of any
applicable (or deemed) grace period, the failure by a Reference Entity to make,
when and where due, any payments in an aggregate amount of not less than
the Payment Required under one or more Obligations”). The 2003 Definitions
add “in accordance with the terms of such Obligations at the time of such
failure.” 2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.5.
118. 1999 DEFINITIONS § 4.6. This occurs when
a Reference Entity of Governmental Authority (a) disaffirms, disclaims,
repudiates or rejects, in whole or in part, or challenges the validity of,
one or more Obligations in an aggregate amount of not less than the
Default Requirement or (b) declares or imposes a moratorium, standstill
or deferral, whether de facto or de jure, with respect to one or more
Obligations in an aggregate amount of not less than the Default
Requirement.
Id. The 2003 Definitions apply when the repudiation or moratorium is actually
followed within sixty days by a Failure to Pay or Restructuring. 2003
DEFINITIONS § 4.6.
119. The 1999 Definitions state:
(a) “Restructuring” means that, with respect to one or more Obligations,
including as a result of an Obligation Exchange, . . . any one or more of
the following events occurs . . . and such event is not provided for under
the terms of such Obligation . . . .
(i) a reduction in the rate or amount of interest payable or the
amount of scheduled interest accruals;
(ii) a reduction in the amount of principal or premium payable at
maturity or at scheduled redemption dates;
(iii) a postponement or other deferral of a date or dates for either (A)
the payment or accrual of interest or (B) the payment of principal or
premium;
(iv) a change in the ranking in priority of payment of any Obligation,
causing the Subordination of such Obligation; or
(v) any change in the currency or composition of any payment of
interest or principal.
[. . .]
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4.7(a), none of the
following shall constitute a Restructuring:
[. . .]
(iii) the occurrence of . . . any of the events . . . in circumstances
where such event does not directly or indirectly result from a
deterioration in the creditworthiness or financial condition of the
Reference Entity.

Do Not Delete

2012]

10/27/2012 3:34 PM

A Brave New World

1243

modern complex events such as the Greek crisis do not fit neatly
under the definitions. The sovereign debt debacle in Greece and
Europe is a new breed of financial crisis, but presents the
recurring problem of defining an applicable credit event with
regard to sovereign credit derivatives.120 Despite all the
aforementioned drama, CDSs on Greek debt were not triggered
until the use of collective action clauses.121 To understand the

(c) If Obligation Exchange has occurred, the determination as to
whether one of the [Restructuring] events . . . has occurred will be based
on a comparison of the terms of the Obligation immediately before such
Obligation Exchange and the terms of the resulting Obligation
immediately following such Obligation Exchange.
[. . .]
1999 DEFINITIONS § 4.7; see also id. at § 4.9 (“‘Obligation Exchange’ means the
mandatory transfer of . . . any securities, obligations, or assets to holders of
Obligations in exchange for such Obligations”).
The 2003 Definitions state:
(a) “Restructuring” means that, with respect to one or more Obligations .
. . , any one or more of the following events occurs in a form that binds
all holders of such Obligation, is agreed between the Reference Entity or
a Governmental Authority and a sufficient number of holders of such
Obligation to bind all holders of the Obligation or is announced (or
otherwise decreed) by a Reference Entity or a Governmental Authority
in a form that binds all holders of such Obligations, and such event is
not expressly provided for under the terms of such Obligation in effect
as of the later of the Trade Date and the date as of which such
Obligation is issued or incurred:
(i) a reduction in the rate or amount of interest payable or the
amount of scheduled interest accruals;
(ii) a reduction in the amount of principal or premium payable at
maturity or at scheduled redemption dates;
(iii) a postponement or other deferral of a date or dates for either (A)
the payment or accrual of interest or (B) the payment of principal or
premium;
(iv) a change in the ranking in priority of payment of any Obligation,
causing the Subordination of such Obligation to any other Obligation;
or
(v) any change in the currency or composition of any payment of
interest or principal to any currency which is not a permitted
currency.
[. . .]
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4.7(a), none of the
following shall constitute a Restructuring:
[. . .]
(iii) the occurrence of, agreement to or announcement of any of the
events described in Section 4.7(a)(i) to (v) in circumstances where
such event does not directly or indirectly result from a deterioration
in the creditworthiness or financial condition of the Reference Entity.
2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.7 (emphasis added). These sections are the main focus of
the analysis section of this Comment.
120. See Verdier, supra note 114, at 51 (noting that corporate entities
usually fall under well-defined regimes).
121. Burne, supra note 112.
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rationale, this section looks to a substance-over-form analysis of
CDSs, then examines how a different approach to the same issues
yields different results, and finally analyzes the language that
required so much activity to finally trigger CDSs on Greek debt.
A. Broad Analysis—Substance over Form
In 2004, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals examined whether a credit event had occurred in regard
to Argentinian sovereign bonds.122 It found that a “voluntary debt
exchange,” in which a bondholder has the option of turning in their
bonds for secured loans on terms less favorable than the original
bond, could qualify as a restructuring credit event under the terms
of the ISDA contract.123
Plaintiff had an investment portfolio that included
Argentinian sovereign bonds.124 Argentina’s political and economic
prospects had been rapidly deteriorating for some time,125 so the
plaintiff purchased CDSs from the defendant to offset its risk.126
Upon announcement of the voluntary debt exchange program, the
plaintiff contacted the defendant to settle the swaps, but
defendant disputed that a “credit event” had occurred and refused
to act.127 Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action, alleging that
the voluntary debt exchange constituted a credit event and
triggered the defendant’s settlement obligations.128
The court undertook to determine whether, as a matter of
law, the voluntary debt exchange was a “restructuring credit
event” covered by the contract.129 The parties used the ISDA
Master Agreement and incorporated the 1999 ISDA Credit
Derivatives Definitions.130 The court began its analysis of the
ISDA contract by noting that interpretation should construe the
agreement in accord with the parties’ intent.131 Ambiguous terms,
however, must be examined along with extrinsic evidence to
gather the correct and intended meaning.132

122. Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y.,
375 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004).
123. Id. at 170.
124. Id. at 171-72.
125. Id. at 175.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 176.
129. Id. at 177.
130. Id. at 178.
131. Id. at 177-78.
132. Id. It added that ambiguities exist when a contractual term could
suggest more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably
intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated
agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, uses, and
terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business. Id. at
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In that case, the ambiguity was what exactly a “mandatory
transfer” meant.133 The official Argentine policy was voluntary and
the defendant proffered that a voluntary exchange could not be a
mandatory transfer. Plaintiff countered, however, contending that
a mandatory transfer included any obligation exchange achieved
by “economic coercion”134 even if classified under the guise of
voluntary participation.135 The court accepted this argument, and
explained that “from Argentina’s perspective, the exchange may
have been voluntary in fact,”136 but its “self-serving”
characterization did not control.137 Finally, the court drew an
important distinction, noting the interpretation focuses solely on
the government action.138
On that note, the court pointed out that “the proper inquiry is
whether the debt exchange caused a restructuring to occur with
respect to any of the Argentine sovereign bonds.”139 The Second
Circuit stated that to be sure that a CDS has not been triggered,
“it must be clear that none of the ‘events’ described in [the ISDA
definitions] occurred with respect either to the participating
obligations or to the nonparticipating obligations.”140
Moving to the facts of that particular case, the court looked to
the effect of the exchange program on both participating and
nonparticipating obligations.141 Under the terms of the swap at
issue, a restructuring credit event occurred upon “a postponement
of payment on interest or principal.”142 The official bond exchange
policy stated that instruments “whose total or partial original
178.
133. Id. at 174. Restructuring included an obligation exchange of the
reference entity wherein the replacement entity has a reduced rate or amount
of interest payable, a reduction in the principal or premium payable at
maturity, a postponement or other deferral of a date or dates for either the
payment or accrual of interest or the payment of principal or premium, a
change in the ranking in priority of payment of any obligation causing the
subordination of such obligation, or any change in the currency or composition
of any payment of interest or principal. Id. at 180. An obligation exchange is a
mandatory transfer of one set of obligations for another. Id.
134. Id. at 181. Plaintiff and the court used Black’s Law Dictionary, defining
“economic coercion” as “conduct that constitutes improper use of economic
power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 252 (7th ed. 1999).
135. Eternity, 375 F.3d at 181.
136. Id. For example, the government debt may have had the intention to
honor its debt obligations to nonparticipants without delay or deduction. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 182. The court noted that with regard to credit events, whether
the plaintiff actually owned sovereign bonds or participated in the exchange
program was irrelevant. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 183.
141. Id. at 182-83.
142. Id. at 182; 1999 DEFINITIONS § 4.7(a)(iii).
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maturity is prior to December 31, 2010 shall receive secured loans
that will extend the average life of the Eligible Security by 3
years.”143 This caused the court to remand the case as it created a
question of fact and the lower court had ruled that it was not a
credit event.144
Rather than present a definitive solution to current CDS
issues, this case illustrates that the ISDA definitions can be
ambiguous when governments use unconventional measures to
solve sovereign debt issues. The Argentine government did not
literally force the plaintiff to exchange his debt for a new
obligation, but this was not dispositive and the broader intent of
the parties and realities of the circumstances controlled the case.
Legal tensions exist in these agreements: protection buyers want
terms to be interpreted widely and take an active approach to look
at the clear reality of a situation, whereas sellers want terms to be
interpreted literally and narrowly.145 ISDA exists somewhere in
between, feeling pressures from both parties and attempting to
uphold its mission.146
B. Different Approaches—Different Results
ISDA refused to declare a restructuring credit event under
this Eternity rationale in the Greek situation.147 This signifies the
shift from the substance-over-form approach towards a more
restrictive analysis. This shows that different approaches yield
different results. If an agreement incorporates the 1999
Definitions, a US court would likely follow the reasoning stated in
Eternity,148 and look to facts to determine whether the voluntary
program is undercut by some economic coercion.149 However, one
143. Eternity, 375 F.3d at 183 (emphasis in original).
144. Id.
145. Jongho Kim, From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to
Approach the Interpretation of Credit Events, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
705, 777-78, 782 (2008).
146. About ISDA, supra note 56.
147. Compare Greek Sovereign Debt FAQ, supra note 110 (opining that the
voluntary debt exchange would not trigger CDS obligations), with ISDA
EMEA Determinations Committee: Restructuring Credit Event Has Occurred
with Respect to The Hellenic Republic, supra note 111 (stating that the
government mandate gave rise to CDS obligations).
148. See Eternity, 375 F.3d at 183 (proffering that voluntary exchange
programs can be obligations if influenced through economic coercion).
149. See Charlemagne, Selecting Default, THE ECONOMIST (July 11, 2011,
11:48 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/07/contagioneuro-zone (suggesting that this is due to the “contagion” effect of an actual
Greek default in regard to countries such as Italy and Spain). Coercive
rhetoric is also rampant in the official statements, for example on July 11,
2011, the
Ministers welcomed the decision by the IMF to disburse the latest
tranche of financial assistance to Greece, as well as the proposals from
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commentator argues this approach creates the scenario that ISDA
hoped to avoid by standardizing its definitions—litigation and a
lack of a clear idea of restructuring as it pertains to credit
events.150
The Eternity court’s stance embraced the spirit, over the
letter of the contract.151 That spirit—the fundamental purpose of a
sovereign CDS—aimed to help protect against the risk of loss
associated with the deterioration of a reference entity’s
creditworthiness.152 Indeed, Eternity argued that the “voluntary
exchange” of bonds was really a “no-other-choice” exchange, and
bondholders had no alternative but to participate in the swap.153
Nevertheless, the 2003 Definitions refer to events that are agreed
upon between the Governmental Authority and a sufficient
number of holders of the obligation to bind all holders of the
obligation.154
This language appears to leave room for the same theory of
economic coercion proffered in Eternity.155 Plaintiff argued that
“the bondholders effectively had a gun to [its] head” even though
the plan had been labeled as voluntary.156 Economic coercion,
under this argument, is “conduct that constitutes improper use of
economic power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one
who wields it.”157 ISDA was not willing to accept this argument,158
consistently pointing to the “voluntary” nature of debt exchange
and not pondering whether it was a Hobson’s choice.159 Indeed, it

the private sector to voluntarily contribute to the financing of a second
programme, building on the work already underway. The ECB
confirmed its position, reaffirmed by its Governing Council last
Thursday, that a credit event or selective default should be avoided.
“Statement by the Eurogroup”, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/123601.pdf (emphasis added).
150. Kim, supra note 145, at 781.
151. See Eternity, 375 F.3d at 181 (stating that “[a] proper interpretation of
the CDS contracts must be drawn from the contract language and . . . from
other indicia of the parties’ intent”).
152. See Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Eternity
Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168 (2d
Cir. 2004) (No. 03-7652) (stating Eternity “developed strategies . . . to offset
the risk that a financial crisis in the sovereign debt of a foreign country would
ruin [the reference entity]”).
153. See id. at 46-47 (adding that bondholders “effectively had ‘a gun to
their head’” and not participating in the program was in effect “to shoot
themselves dead”).
154. 2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.7(a).
155. Brief for Eternity, supra note 152, at 46.
156. Id.
157. Eternity, 375 F.3d at 181; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 134, at
252.
158. See Greek Sovereign Debt FAQ, supra note 110 (making no reference to
any possibility of a coercive nature to the program).
159. Hobson’s choice is a philosophical theory that is the illusion of a free-
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was not until Greek lawmakers imposed binding requirements on
all bondholders that ISDA determined a restricting credit event
had occurred.
C. A Narrow Analysis—Strict and Literal
At times, ISDA tweaks its credit derivatives definitions in an
attempt to provide clarity and understanding.160 Even in the
Eternity decision, the investment fund used a “User’s Guide” draft
to the ISDA published 1999 Definitions to further support a broad
interpretation of the contract.161 ISDA released some
commentaries and supplements to the 1999 Definitions,162 but
ultimately abandoned “repairing” the 1999 Definitions in favor of
producing new 2003 Definitions.163 The updates, however,
appeared to be primarily revised with regard to corporate bonds
rather than sovereign debt,164 although some changes were made
due to the Argentina case.165

will decision, but it is really a choice with no alternative. See generally I.N.S.
v. Chada 462 U.S. 919, 968 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that whether
Congress should delegate rulemaking authority to executive agencies or
undertake “the hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to
cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy landscape” was a
Hobson’s choice); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658,
679 (1978) (describing a Hobson’s choice between keeping the peace or paying
civil damages).
160. See
Guide
to
ISDA
Publications,
ISDA
18-19
(2011),
http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/pubguide.pdf, and ISDA Bookstore –
Credit Derivatives Definitions, Supplements and Commentaries (Oct. 21,
2011),
http://www.isda.org/publications/isdacredit-deri-def-sup-comm.aspx
(listing the main credit derivative publications).
161. See Eternity, 375 F.3d at 182 (offering that the commentary clarified
the reference to mandatory transfer rather than restricted it and therefore an
optional exchange can constitute a Restructuring). However, it was never
formally promulgated. See also Allen & Overy, An Introduction to the
Documentation of OTC Derivatives, 3-4 (May 2002), http://www.isda.org/
educat/pdf/documentation_of_derivatives.pdf (describing the process of
multiple commentaries, supplements, and updated definitions).
162. Restructuring Supplement to the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives
Definitions, ISDA (May 2001), http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/Restructuring
_Supplement.pdf; Commentary on Restructuring Supplement, ISDA (2001),
http://www.isda.org/whatsnew/pdf/Commentary_on_Restructuring.pdf.
163. See A Retrospective of ISDA’s Activities in 2002, ISDA at 8 (Jan. 2003),
http://www.isda.org/wwa/retrospective_2002_master.pdf (outlining briefly the
developments in credit derivatives and touching on the new features of the
2003 Definitions).
164. See id. (stating that improvements came from loophole exposed by a
corporate default and these “major tests of the market have been instrumental
in defining this new document”); see also BOMFIN, supra note 23, at 21 (adding
“[i]n practice, however, the vast majority of [credit derivatives] reportedly
reference non-sovereign entities”).
165. See News Release, ISDA, ISDA Publishes 2003 ISDA Credit
Derivatives Definitions (Feb. 11, 2003), available at http://www.isda.org/
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Still, though, the 2003 Definitions restrict what constitutes a
restructuring by removing the reference to an “Obligation
Exchange.”166 Narrowing the terms protects the interests of
protection sellers, but also aims to uphold the integrity of the
markets.167 Furthermore, this strict interpretation might reduce
moral hazard by avoiding situations where the buyer will have the
incentive and capacity to precipitate a credit event.168 Under the
narrow 2003 Definitions, it appears that a reluctant minority of
creditors cannot trigger a restructuring credit event.169 A
“voluntary” exchange will not trigger a credit event unless all
holders tender their obligations, and even then some
commentators have suggested it would not trigger a credit
event.170 That de jure argument concludes that if somehow every
bondholder individually agreed to a restructuring, it would not
constitute a credit event because it would lack any necessary
coercive elements.171 Nevertheless, it is impractical and impossible
for every bondholder to participate, rendering a literal reading of
this definition nearly useless.172
Commentators that argue voluntary exchanges are not a
credit event under the 2003 Definitions also note that this theory
reflects “market practice.”173 The reason for apparent industry
“preference for excluding voluntary restructurings is that if there

whatsnew/press021103.html (noting that “[t]he new provisions address major
challenges that have shaped the course of the credit derivatives business”).
166. See Verdier, supra note 114, at 65 (noting that the ruling in Eternity
was not repudiated by ISDA in the 2003 Definitions).
167. See id. 53-55 (arguing that a broad definition would allow protection
buyers to trigger the swap “opportunistically”). That commentator suggested
that a protection buyer could get the full payment for the reference amount,
even if a true credit event did not occur, which might be much higher than the
market value of the obligations. Id. at 54. He refers to this as “free protection
against market risk for the protection buyer.” Id.
168. Id.; see also Paul Krugman, Appeasing the Bond Gods, N.Y. TIMES
(August
19,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/opinion/20krugman.html (arguing that
some economic policy is made to appease bond investors who have coercive
power to drive up borrowing costs of governments by driving bond prices
downward).
169. Kim, supra note 145, at 791; see also Verdier, supra note 114, at 71
(noting that with a collective action clause, nonparticipants could not trigger
the obligation under the 2003 Definitions).
170. See Verdier, supra note 114, at 71 (suggesting that all creditors
individually agreeing to a voluntary exchange restructuring would not have
any coercive elements and thus would not be binding as contemplated by the
definitions).
171. Id.
172. Id.; Kim, supra note 145, at 791.
173. See Verdier, supra note 114, at 71 (adding that many participants were
satisfied with the district court’s ruling in Eternity before the circuit court
reversed and applied its economic coercion theory).
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were credit events, protection buyers might have reduced
incentives to negotiate the best possible arrangement.”174 That
would leave a possibility that after settlement of the swaps, the
protection seller is left with excessively devalued obligations.175
Moreover, certainty and objectivity are paramount to credit event
analysis, and a narrow, literal reading helps to further that.176
Following this thinking, any analogical interpretation of these
events after the fact should be avoided.177
While advocates of a narrow reading contend it promotes the
best settlement, the converse stance contends that this prolongs
the crisis because a more effective remedy could have been crafted
but for policymakers’ insistence on avoiding the stain of a “credit
event.”178 However, before the Determinations Committee’s
decision in March 2012, many holders of Greek CDSs did not give
up, still hoping for a default.179 The “voluntary” solution to the
Greek Debt crisis did not trigger CDSs, regardless of how much
coercive pressure existed, because it was not “in a form that binds
all holders.”180 Indeed, the Determinations Committee needed
governmental action to make the financial haircuts binding on all
bondholders to satisfy the contractual language, and was
unwilling to accept the argument that economic coercion could
result from an agreement between “a sufficient number of holders .
. . to bind all holders.”181
CDSs are complex instruments that only become more
complicated when their payment is contingent upon an everevolving global economic crisis. The Greek sovereign debt crisis
has provided an example of the difficulties in determining whether
a triggering event has occurred. Previously, courts embraced a
theory of economic coercion that would allow a “voluntary”
agreement to trigger CDSs. The current CDS regime has removed
the words “obligation exchange” from its definitions. This has
shifted the paradigm to a more literal approach and swaps will not
be triggered if a program is voluntary in name only.

174. Id. at 72.
175. Id.
176. Kim, supra note 145, at 795.
177. Id.
178. The inference that seems to follow is that the voluntary debt exchange
with a fifty percent haircut is the best solution, and would not have been
reached if this type of agreement constitutes a credit event.
179. Gretchen Morgenson, Sad Proof of Europe’s Fallout, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/06/business/in-mf-global-sad-proofof-europes-fallout.html.
180. 2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.7(a).
181. Id.; see also Burne, supra note 112 (stating the use of the collective
action clauses made the debt exchange mandatory and satisfied the
requirements of § 4.7(a)).
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IV. PROPOSAL
Huxley’s Brave New World paints the picture of a miserable
social dynamic—but the citizens manage to cope. Likewise,
Western Europe and the global economy will survive the sovereign
debt crisis; however, what emerges may be a system nobody ever
intended. In order to restore the balance between the substance of
a CDS and the literal contractual language, this Comment
proposes that ISDA embrace the Eternity theory of economic
coercion. Specifically, the 2003 Definitions describe a circumstance
where there is an agreement between “a Governmental Authority
and a sufficient number of holders . . . to bind all holders of the
obligation.”182 This is the language that should embrace the theory
of Hobson’s choice and give protection buyers the benefit of their
bargain when situations like the Greek crisis occur, but before the
government intervenes. This can be done by determining whether
a voluntary exchange is driven by economic coercion, defined as an
“improper use of economic power to compel another to submit to
the wishes of one who wields it.”183
This current use of CDSs may be creating hazardous market
conditions by providing an illusory sense of protection.184 In this
brave new world of sovereign debt, “bond vigilantes” have make a
practice of going after heavily indebted economies and driving the
price down.185 This happened to Greece, and after the tentative
solution to the Greek crisis emerged, major concerns remained
about other European economies with similar large debt
burdens.186 As such, bond prices in Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Ireland have taken hits and are the focal point of growing

182. 2003 DEFINITIONS § 4.7(a).
183. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 68, at 294.
184. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 179 (stating “the insurance that has
been written on all this Greek debt will not cover investor losses generated by
the 50 percent write-down—a disturbing consequence to those who thought
they were buying insurance against that very risk”); see also Louise Story &
Julie Creswell, Debt Plan Could Deny Those Who Bet on Default, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/business/global/debt-plancould-deny-those-who-bet-on-default.html?ref=europe
(quoting
a
chief
economist at a major international bank as saying “If a 50 percent notional
haircut doesn’t trigger an insurance contract on that debt, I mean what’s going
to trigger it? . . . If you bought protection and now all of a sudden, a 50 percent
haircut is imposed on you and you don’t get a payout on your insurance, that
really casts a large doubt”).
185. See Krugman, supra note 168 (singling out “investors who would pull
the plug on spendthrift governments, driving up their borrowing costs and
precipitating a crisis”).
186. Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Gauging the Fallout of Another
Rescue, N.Y. TIMES (October 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/
business/gauging-the-fallout-of-another-rescue.html?ref=europe&pagewanted
=all.
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unrest.187
Now, it seems to be that an entity seeking to protect itself
against loss by purchasing a sovereign CDS might find itself at the
center of highly political and volatile negotiations and ultimately
be pressured into accepting a similar type of loss that it originally
hoped to hedge against.188 In any event, it is an important purpose
of the ISDA definitions to give a clear idea of restructuring as it
pertains to credit events.189 This promotes market efficiency and
avoids wasteful litigation.190 The narrow evolution of CDS
interpretation, however, may have detracted from the underlying
purpose and utility of CDSs on sovereign debt.
The voluntary debt exchange was intended to be the best-case
scenario,191 but it left protection buyers without recourse, further
hoping for a credit event,192 which eventually came because Greece
had to force participation in the exchanges. Although some
contend that the market prefers narrow interpretations,193 some
have begun to speak out against this position.194 Those who sought
to hedge have taken a significant loss on Greek debt and were
without recourse until the government intervened.195 This has led
some to question the legitimacy of CDSs in this context.196 If they
do not hedge actual risk of loss, purchasers might reconsider
entering these agreements.197
Derivative markets perform an important economic function
by enabling an efficient transfer of risk bearing from market
participants least equipped to bear risk to market participants
best equipped to bear risk.198 Paradoxically, speculators give a free
market valuation to these risks and enable protection seekers to
readily hedge their risk, but also present a threat to distort

187. See Graham Bowley, Interest Rates on Italian Bonds Rise to New
Levels, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/
business/global/italy-bonds-push-higher.html (noting that the rates at which
Italy was being forced to sell its Bonds were reaching levels that forced
Greece, Ireland, and Portugal to seek financial rescue).
188. Morgenson, supra note 179; Story & Creswell, supra note 184.
189. See Kim, supra note 145, at 781 (2008) (proffering that litigating
disputes over the interpretation of Definitions is the exact scenario that ISDA
hoped to prevent).
190. See id. (suggesting ISDA’s promotion of a clear understanding hopes to
prevent “litigation and hotly contested disputes”).
191. Verdier, supra note 114, at 72.
192. See Story & Creswell, supra note 184 (noting the displeasure of some
investors that the swaps were not triggered when the voluntary haircut first
came out).
193. Verdier, supra note 114, at 72.
194. Morgenson, supra note 179.
195. Story & Creswell, supra note 183.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. JACQUE, supra note 42, at 294.
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price.199 As it stands, though, these objectives are not being met.
Risk is not being transferred because holders are still subject to
significant loss under the narrow interpretation that allows
coercive yet “voluntary” restructurings.200
Reading economic coercion into § 4.7(a) will help avoid
mistakes made in the past. A seller’s hope that none of these
instruments ever require a payout was exactly what lead to the
rapid insolvency of AIG in 2008.201 This is critically important
because “[f]ailings of the risk management function are at the core
of the unsavory tales of derivative debacles.”202 Market
participants reacted to the triggering of Greek CDSs well, with an
analyst calling it “a clear demonstration that there is a functioning
hedging tool out there” and suggesting that there would be
positive implications for European bond markets.203 Otherwise,
this brave new world may have eliminated the possibility of a
restructuring credit event from ever occurring but for the most
drastic measures. The Greek scenario now stands for the method
by which a sovereign restructures its debt and avoids triggering
swaps. Widening § 4.7(a)’s interpretation to include economic
coercion would further promote the functionality of CDSs as a tool
to hedge against loss.
All in all, reliance on credit derivatives has added greater fear
and uncertainty to this already-hectic saga, and the Greek case
study reveals that CDSs may be falling short of their purpose and
utility.204 Even before the Greek saga, CDS interpretation
presented “thorny issues,”205 those of which become more apparent
as the story unfolds. Furthermore, the tension between the
Eternity opinion and ISDA’s 2003 Definitions will continue so long
as the “voluntary debt exchange” solutions are the model for
solving sovereign debt crises. This interpretational precedent has
created a loophole that has the potential to undermine one of the
fundamental benefits of CDSs.

199. See id. (offering that concentration of a derivative position in a small
number of entities will distort the risk allocation process and potentially harm
end-users).
200. See Story & Creswell, supra note 184 (describing that holders of bonds
are taking significant losses on the face value of the debt).
201. See JACQUE, supra note 42, at 278-79 (explaining that AIG’s critical
flaw was its overexposure to CDS and the lesson to learn from that meltdown
is “there is no such thing as a free lunch”).
202. Id. at 281.
203. Moses, supra note 113.
204. See Baker & Toyer, supra note 101 (quoting Chancellor Merkel
stressing the voluntary nature of the private participation while pushing hard
for a viable solution to the crisis); Morgenson, supra note 179 (outlining how
bondholders suffered a “disturbing consequence” when their bonds took a
haircut but CDS obligations were not triggered).
205. Verdier, supra note 114, at 52.
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V. CONCLUSION
The European sovereign debt crisis has shed new light on the
use of CDSs. International finance has entered a new and uneasy
era with sovereign debt crises. Credit default swaps are subtly
trailing in the wake of these markets and the ongoing political
debates of how to solve the regional issues. The industry groups
that facilitate CDS use have squarely rejected a judicial doctrine
embraced by American courts, but this appears to have been done
at the expense of some utility of CDSs. To minimize the malicious
influence of these instruments while maximizing their market
utility, § 4.7(a) interpretation should be interpreted to include the
theory of economic coercion and Hobson’s choice.

